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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of, among other orders and judgments, a 
final summary judgment entered against Leland A. Martineau 
personally for a debt secured by a mortgage on real property 
prior to the sale of the property. The order was entered by the 
Honorable Scott Daniels in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court 
had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989) because the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989). This court currently has 
jurisdiction pursuant to a transfer of this case by the Supreme 
Court of Utah to this Court dated July 27, 1989, pursuant to the 
Utah Supreme Court's authority to do so under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case was initially an action for a debt on an oral 
contract. The defendant Leland Martineau counterclaimed for 
amounts due him from plaintiffs. Thereafter, plaintiffs produced 
a mortgage securing the debt, and the parties entered a 
stipulation as to the amount of the debt and requiring plaintiffs 
to foreclose on the property prior to seeking a deficiency 
judgment. A third party assignee brought a foreclosure action in 
Idaho; and when defenses were raised in that action, the 
plaintiffs came back before the Utah court to seek to be allowed 
to proceed against Martineau personally without being required to 
foreclose the property. The court amended the judgment to allow 
plaintiffs to do so. Later, when the case was in a posture to go 
to trial on defendant's offsets and counterclaims, the plaintiffs 
made a motion for summary judgment dismissing the entire action 
because defendant Martineau had assigned his claims to a 
partnership of which he was a general partner. Without allowing 
the substitution or joinder of the partnership as a party, the 
court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 
remaining issues in the case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's 
motion to set aside the Order and Judgment entered on October 1, 
1985, based on the fact that the plaintiffs, Michael Strand and 
MLK Investments, had assigned their causes of action to Nupetco 
Associates prior to the commencement of the action and were not 
the real parties in interest? 
2. Did the trial court err in treating the October 1, 1985, 
order as a personal judgment against Leland Martineau for a sum 
certain and in amending the order to allow plaintiffs1 assignee 
to proceed against the personal assets of defendant Leland A. 
Martineau prior to sale of the mortgaged property and the 
determination of a deficiency? 
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3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
precluding defendant Leland Martineau from asserting the offsets, 
defenses and claims specifically reserved in the October 1985 
order, in light of the fact that the court had previously allowed 
the named plaintiffs to continue the action despite not being the 
real party in interest and without granting the defendant the 
opportunity to obtain written approval from the Hammons-Martineau 
Partnership to assert the offsets and claims in this action or to 
join the Partnership as a defendant? 
4. Did the trial court err in substituting Nupetco 
Associates as the plaintiff on its own motion and over 
defendants' objections? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action 
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest. . . . No action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest until a reasonable time has been 
allowed after objection for ratification of 
commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of the real party in interest. 
2. Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(c) Transfer of Interest. In the case of 
any transfer of interest, the action may be 
continued by or against the original party, 
unless the court upon motion directs the 
person to whom the interest is transferred to 
be substituted in the action or joined with 
the original party. Service of the motion 
shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a) 
of this Rule. 
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3. Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order 
or proceeding for . . . (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-22. Nature of a partner's right in 
specific partnership property. 
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners 
of specific partnership property holding as a 
tenant in partnership. 
(2) The incidence of this tenancy are such 
that: 
(a) A partner, subject to the 
provisions of this Chapter and to any 
agreement between the partners, has an equal 
right with his partners to possess specific 
partnership property for partnership 
purposes; but he has no right to possess such 
property for any other purposes without the 
consent of his partners. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1. Form of Action -- Judgment— 
Special Execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall 
be given adjudging the amount due, with costs 
and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged 
property, or some part, thereof, to satisfy 
said amount and accruing costs, and directing 
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating 
4 
to sales on execution, and a special 
execution or order of sale shall be issued 
for that purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-2. Deficiency Judgment—Execution. 
If it appears from the return of the officer 
making the sale that the proceeds are 
insufficient and a balance still remains due, 
judgment therefor must then be docketed by 
the clerk and execution may be issued for 
such balance as in other cases; but no 
general execution shall issue until after the 
sale of the mortgaged property and the 
application of the amount realized as 
aforesaid. 
Idaho Code, § 6-101. 
6-101. Proceedings in foreclosure—Effect of 
foreclosure on holder of unrecorded lien.— 
There can be but one action for the recovery 
of any debt, or the enforcement of any right 
secured by mortgage upon real estate which 
action must be in accordance with the 
Provisions of this chapter. In such action 
the court may, by its judgment, direct a sale 
of the incumbered property (or so much 
thereof as may be necessary) and the 
application of the proceeds of the sale to 
the payment of the costs of the court and the 
expenses of the sale, and the amount due to 
the plaintiff; and sales of real estate under 
judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and 
liens are subject to redemption as in the 
case of sales under execution; (and if it 
appear from the sheriff's return that the 
proceeds are insufficient, and a balance 
still remains due, judgment can then be 
docketed for such balance against the 
defendant or defendants personally liable for 
the debt), and it becomes a lien on the real 
estate of such judgment debtor, as in other 
cases on which execution may be issued. 
No person holding a conveyance from or under 
the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or 
having a lien thereon, which conveyance or 
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lien does not appear of record in the proper 
office at the commencement of the action, 
need be made a party to such action; and the 
judgment therein rendered, and th€> 
proceedings therein had, are as conclusive 
against the party holding such unrecorded 
conveyance or lien as if he had been made a 
party to the action. 
8. Idaho Code § 6-108. 
6-108. Deficiency judgments—Amount 
restricted.— No court in the state of 
Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a 
deficiency judgment in any case involving a 
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in 
any amount greater than the difference 
between the mortgage indebtedness, as 
determined by the decree, plus costs of 
foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable 
value of the mortgaged property, to be 
determined by the court in the decree upon 
the taking of evidence of such value. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The original complaint in this matter was filed on August 2, 
1983, by the plaintiffs Michael W. Strand and MLK Investments 
(hereinafter "Strand" and "MLK" or "plaintiffs") against 
defendant Leland A. Martineau (hereinafter "Martineau"), Charles 
Waters, Magic Valley Motors, Inc., and Magic Valley Properties, 
seeking judgment in the amount of $427,989.25 plus interest 
allegedly loaned defendants by plaintiffs. (R. 2) The only 
defendant served with the summons and complaint was Leland A. 
Martineau, and he counterclaimed for amounts owing him from 
plaintiffs for auditing and financial services rendered. (R. 5) 
The matter went to trial on September 3, 19 85; and although 
plaintiffs did not plead that the loan was secured by a mortgage, 
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plaintiffs did introduce a mortgage signed by Leland A. Martineau 
and Charles Waters for Magic Valley Properties in their capacity 
as general partners. This mortgage purportedly secured real 
property located in Cassia County, Idaho, owned by Magic Valley 
Properties. (R. 205) This mortgage was not supported by a 
promissory note or any other documentation independently 
evidencing the debt. (R. 205) After the noon recess on 
September 3rd, the defendant argued a motion to dismiss based on 
the fact that the plaintiffs had not sought to foreclose the 
mortgage prior to seeking judgment against Leland A. Martineau as 
required by the one action rule embodied in Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-37-1 and 2 (1987). (R. 158-59). 
During the course of that argument, the parties reached a 
stipulation that there was a loan in the amount of $327,989.25 to 
Magic Valley Properties which was secured by a mortgage on the 
real property in Idaho, despite the absence of an underlying 
promissory note. The parties further agreed that plaintiffs were 
required to first foreclose the property and exhaust their 
security prior to seeking a deficiency judgment against Leland 
Martineau. (R. 165-69) The other terms of the stipulation are 
less than clear, and the record itself is contradictory. In the 
Minute Entry of September 3, 1985, the court orders the 
following: 
1) this case is hereby dismissed without 
prejudice; 
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2) the parties may proceed in the Idaho 
Courts [sic]; 
3) no fees are allowed as to this case. 
(R. 41) . 
The subsequent Order and Judgment entered on the stipulation 
on October 11, 1985f includes terms not contained in the Minute 
Entry or transcript. By its terms, the parties agreed to reserve 
the issue of whether the remaining $100,000 in dispute was a loan 
or an investment by the plaintiffs, (R. 167) and the parties 
agreed to reserve all other issues and defenses except as to the 
validity of the mortgage, including but not limited to Leland A. 
Martineau!s counterclaims and offsets. The order also included 
language that plaintiffs were required to foreclose the mortgage 
"before proceeding against the personal assets of the defendant 
Martineau." (R. 51) A copy of this Order is included in the 
Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "A" and by reference made a 
part hereof. 
Thereafter, on December 3, 1985, Nupetco Associates, 
plaintiffs1 assignee and an entity which was not a party to this 
action, filed to foreclose the real property secured by the 
mortgage in Cassia County, Idaho. (R. 67) It was only at that 
time that defendant Leland Martineau learned that Mike Strand and 
MLK had assigned their interest in the mortgage at issue in this 
action to Nupetco on April 27, 1983, over three months prior to 
having filed the complaint. (R. 60 and 271) Upon learning this, 
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Leland Martineau filed for relief from the Order and Judgment 
pursuant to Rules 60 and 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
on the basis that Strand and MLK were not the real parties in 
interest. Defendant argued that, as a result, he was denied 
remedies and defenses which would have been available to him 
against Nupetco as a third-party assignee. He also argued that 
the knowledge was essential for him to determine how to defend 
the suit and assert his counterclaims. (R. 58 - 63) In 
addition, the terms he had stipulated to on September 3rd were 
based on his understanding that Strand and MLK were the real 
parties in interest. 
Although not made a party to this suit, Nupetco filed a 
memorandum in reply to this Rule 6 0 motion which asserted the 
defense of collateral estoppel, waiver based on Martineaufs 
alleged prior knowledge of the assignment and denial that 
plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest. (R. 83 - 90) . 
Plaintiffs Strand and MLK also filed a memorandum in reply (R. 
108 - 113) alleging Martineau did have actual and/or constructive 
notice of the assignment, and that even if he did not, the 
assignment was irrelevant. In the memorandum, the plaintiffs 
argued that, "If Nupetco is a successor in interest to Strand, 
any defenses Martineau had against Strand, would also lie against 
Nupetco." (R. Ill) The defendant filed a reply memorandum 
challenging the validity of the assignment on the basis that the 
9 
judgment was not a final judgment capable of being assigned and 
responding to the other arguments made in opposition. (R. 273 -
279) . 
After taking the matter under advisement (R. 117), Judge 
Daniels summarily denied the defendant's motion for relief from 
the Order and Judgment. (R. 118) A copy of the Order is 
included in the Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "B" and by 
reference made a part hereof. On November 24, 1986, even though 
Nupetco had still not been made a party to the action, Ralph 
Petty filed an appearance of counsel on its behalf. (R. 125) 
On December 9, 1986, defendant Leland Martineau filed a 
Notice of Appeal from the October 11, 1985, Order and Judgment 
and the court's denial of defendant's motion for relief from this 
order. (R. 128) While this appeal was later dismissed 
supposedly on stipulation of the parties (R. 302), that document 
was only a small part of a larger stipulation which would have 
expedited resolution of the issues in several cases pending 
between the parties. 
Pursuant to its terms, the parties would have agreed to: 
(1) dismiss the appeal; (2) consolidate this case with the case 
of Strand v. Martineau, also filed in the Third Judical District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Civil No. C81-5600; and (3) 
agree to lift the automatic stay imposed by the bankruptcy court 
in the bankruptcy of Magic Valley Properties so that plaintiffs 
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could proceed to foreclose the Cassia County property. (R. 319) 
Although two sets of documents outlining the entire agreement 
were sent to John Caine and a set was sent to Ralph Petty, they 
each refused to execute all of the documents. Instead, they 
executed the stipulation to dismiss the appeal and filed it. (R. 
318 - 321) 
Although the entire stipulation would have allowed the 
plaintiffs to proceed to foreclose the property, on November 4, 
1987, the attorney for Nupetco, Ralph Petty, filed a motion to 
amend the judgment on behalf of plaintiffs Strand and MLK. (R. 
304) The motion sought to amend the Order and Judgment of 
October 11, 1985, to remove the requirement that plaintiff 
foreclose on the real property before proceeding against the 
personal assets of Leland Martineau. The motion alleged that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to such an amendment because the 
defendants in the Idaho foreclosure suit had asserted defenses 
against Nupetco which plaintiffs asserted Lee Martineau had 
agreed to waive as against Michael Strand and MLK in this matter. 
In essence, they argued that Nupetco should not be required to 
exhaust the security before proceeding against Martineau1s 
personal assets to punish Martineau for defenses raised by Magic 
Valley Properties against Nupetco. (R. 305 - 313) The motion 
was summarily granted by Judge Daniels in a Minute Entry dated 
November 20, 1987. (R. 338) A copy of the Order on this ruling 
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is included in the Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "C" and by 
reference made a part hereof. 
The defendant Martineau made a motion for rehearing on the 
basis that: 
1. The original stipulation and subsequent Order and 
Judgment does not grant a money judgment against Lee Martineau 
personally; 
2. That such a result had not been intended by the parties 
at the time they entered stipulation; 
3. That a judgment prior to sale of security is contrary to 
the one action rule outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 and 2; 
and 
4. That the defenses at issue raised in Idaho were by Magic 
Valley Properties and Magic Valley Motors, entities not parties 
to this suit, against Nupetco, an entity not yet a party either. 
(R. 345 - 348 and R. 375 - 379) 
At approximately the same time, defendant Martineau also 
made a motion to consolidate a second suit brought by Strand 
against Martineau seeking damages for alleged professional 
malpractice. It was Lee Martineaufs position that there were 
similar parties and issues arising from the same factual 
scenarios and that consolidation would be judicially prudent as 
it would resolve all legal disputes between the parties. (R. 
343) Although plaintiffs had originally agreed to such a 
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consolidation, (R. 319) they later changed their minds and filed 
objections to defendant's motion. (R. 383 - 386) 
On December 4, 1987, Judge Daniels denied Martineau's 
motions to consolidate and the motion for rehearing. He set 
trial for January 19 and 20, 1988, and ordered Martineau to 
submit an affidavit outlining the offsets and claims he would be 
asserting at trial in order to support Martineaufs motion to stay 
execution pending trial. (R. 391) Within 10 days, Martineau 
submitted this affidavit (R. 420) which outlined the offsets 
claimed and categorized them as follows: 
1. Amounts owing from plaintiffs and their related entities 
for accounting services rendered them by defendant Martineau. 
2. For reimbursement of one-half of monies expended and 
services performed by Martineau on behalf of Magic Valley 
Properties based on defendant Martineau's position that Strand 
was a partner of that entity, a claim which Mr. Strand denies. 
3. Amounts owing Martineau from Strand pursuant to a 
judgment entered against Strand in the case of Strand v. Hammons, 
Civil No. C82-8686, entered in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter, the 
"Hammons judgment"). The judgment is held by the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership of which Martineau is a partner. 
(R. 420 - 422). 
After reviewing the affidavits, Mr. Petty filed, once again 
13 
on behalf of the plaintiffs Strand and MLK, a motion to lift the 
stay of execution entered by Judge Daniels pending trial. The 
motion was based on a challenge to the offsets in dispute as 
follows: 
1. That Martineau could not assert claims against Strand 
for accounting services performed on behalf of Magic Valley 
Properties because that entity was in bankruptcy and such a claim 
was a violation of the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court. 
(R. 432) 
2. That Martineau could not personally utilize the judgment 
against Strand as a matter of law because the judgment is a 
partnership asset (R. 435) and because it did not exist when the 
action was filed. 
The motion was summarily denied in a Minute Entry dated 
December 22, 1987. (R. 444) 
The remaining issues came up for trial on January 19, 1988, 
before the Honorable Judge Moffat as a result of a calendar 
switch between him and Judge Daniels. (R. 44 8) In a pretrial 
conference in the Judge's chambers, Mr. Caine and Mr. Petty 
asserted that Martineau no longer had the right to assert any 
offsets as he had assigned all of his claims to the Hammons-
Martineau Partnership, and a partner cannot personally use 
partnership property. Judge Moffat continued the trial and 
ordered counsel to brief the issue. 
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In defense of plaintiff's position on this matter, (See 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintifffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment at R. 453 - 506) defendant argued as 
follows (R. 507 -520): 
1. Pursuant to the express provisions of Rule 17(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs1 objection that 
Martineau was no longer the real party in interest is not grounds 
for dismissal of his counterclaims; 
2. The court had previously denied Martineau's motion for 
relief from judgment based on the fact that plaintiffs had not 
been the real party in interest when plaintiff filed its 
complaint, and therefore it would now be inequitable and improper 
to grant plaintiffs' motion and deny Martineau his right to 
assert offsets on the very same basis• At the very least, 
Martineau should be given opportunity to join the partnership or 
obtain ratification from that entity to proceed. He had 
previously been specifically precluded from doing so by Judge 
Moffat (See p. 21 of the transcript beginning at R. 698); 
3. At all times, Strand, MLK and Nupetco recognized any 
judgment was subject to Martineau's offsets and each had notice 
of the offsets since at least 1983; 
4. The partnership agreement itself authorized Martineau to 
assert the offsets; 
5. Plaintiffs had mischaracterized the nature of the 
offsets; and 
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6. Rule 13(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
use of a claim which matures after the instigation of a suit. 
After hearing on these issues on April 22, 1988, (See the 
transcript beginning R. 698) Judge Daniels took the matter under 
advisement. (R. 560) On August 23, 1988, Judge Daniels issued a 
decision that "The law appears to be that one who assigns his 
offsets cannot assert them as a counterclaim. The motion for 
summary judgment is granted." (R. 561) 
After numerous objections to a multitude of proposed orders 
and after denial of plaintiff's motion for relief from the 
judgment on the basis that the decision was contrary to law (R. 
564), an order was entered by the court on November 10, 1988. 
(R. 605) This order was subsequently set aside for the 
plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and give defendant's counsel notice of 
the order and opportunity to object. (R. 606) The final order 
was entered on April 26, 1989, (R. 665 - 666) wherein the court 
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all 
claims of Lee Martineau against Nupetco, Strand and MLK. A copy 
of this Order is included in the Addendum to this brief as 
Exhibit "D" and by reference made a part hereof. 
Finally, in a hearing on October 21, 1988, on a completely 
different set of motions, the issue as to whether the pleadings 
should be amended and Nupetco be formally joined as a party 
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happened to be raised by the Court. (See pg. 5 of the transcript 
beginning at R. 696) Mr. Caine, attorney for Strand and MLK, 
argued that Nupetco had been the plaintiff all along. (Tr. 
beginning 696 at pg. 5) Over defendant's objections, the court 
granted a motion to amend the pleadings. (Tr. beginning 696 at 
p. 9) The initial order substituting parties was signed on 
November 10, 1988. It was, however, set aside on April 10, 1989, 
due once again to plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 4-504 
and give the defendant notice of the order and opportunity to 
object. (R. 600) A second order was entered on April 26, 1989. 
(R. 663) A copy of this Order is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit "E" and by reference made a part hereof. 
Subsequently, defendant Martineau filed his notice of 
appeal. (R. 667) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The complaint was filed by plaintiffs Strand and MLK in 
an action on an alleged oral contract for a loan. At trial, the 
defendant Martineau argued that the case should be dismissed 
because the plaintiffs had produced a mortgage allegedly securing 
the debt, and pursuant to the one action rule, they should be 
precluded from seeking a judgment prior to foreclosing the 
property. During those arguments, the parties reached a 
stipulation, and an order was entered. Thereafter, defendant 
Martineau learned that the plaintiffs had assigned the mortgage 
17 
to Nupetco Associates three months prior to their filing a 
complaint. He made a motion for relief from the judgment, and it 
was denied by the court. It was error to deny the motion as the 
assignment and defendant Martineaufs lack of knowledge thereof 
precluded him from asserting defenses against the real party in 
interest, and it prejudiced him in his negotiation of and his 
agreement to the stipulation. 
2. After plaintiffs' assignor, Nupetco Associates, had 
difficulty foreclosing the property in Idaho, the plaintiffs 
Strand and MLK sought a personal judgment against Martineau for 
the entire amount of the debt to which the parties had 
stipulated. The court granted the motion on the basis that 
defendant Martineau had been in contempt of the stipulation, and 
the Order and Judgment was amended to allow the plaintiff to 
proceed against the personal assets of defendant Martineau. This 
is contrary to the law as the one action rule embodied in Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 and 2 requires a party to foreclose property 
prior to seeking a deficiency judgment, and there is no authority 
to allow a party to circumvent that requirement in a situation 
where one party is allegedly in contempt. 
In addition, there were factual issues as to whether 
Martineau was actually breaching the stipulation and whether the 
plaintiffs were not also doing so. Finally, at no time did the 
defendant stipulate that judgment be entered against him, at no 
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time did the court hear evidence to determine if the debt, if 
any, was that of Lee Martineau, and no prior money judgment had 
been entered before the court amended the Order and Judgment to 
allow the plaintiffs to proceed against Martineau personally. 
There being no basis in law or fact to do so, it was error to 
grant plaintiffs1 motion and treat the Order of October 1985 as a 
personal judgment against Leland Martineau. 
3. During the course of these proceedings, the defendant 
Martineau assigned his counterclaims and offsets to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership. Nupetco filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the basis that Martineau could no longer 
assert these claims because a partner cannot use partnership 
property for his own benefit. The court granted the motion and 
dismissed the defendant's claims. 
The dismissal was error under Rules 17 and 25 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure without first allowing defendant time to 
join or substitute the partnership as a party or obtain 
ratification of his purported authority to assert the claims. In 
addition, the rule that a partner cannot personally use 
partnership property is statutorily made subject to an agreement 
between the parties to the contrary. In this case, the use of 
the offsets was authorized by the Hammons-Martineau Partnership 
Agreement and by the partnership minutes. Finally, the dismissal 
was inequitable in light of the history of the case wherein the 
court allowed the named plaintiffs to continue the action even 
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though they had assigned the mortgage at issue prior to filing 
the suit. As a result, the order granting summary judgment and 
dismissing the case should be vacated. 
4. Although the attorney for Nupetco filed an appearance of 
counsel in November of 19 86, Nupetco was not made a party to this 
case until the order entered in April of 1989. In light of the 
totality of the circumstances, it was error to allow Nupetco to 
be substituted for Strand and MLK at such a late date. Prior to 
Nupetco becoming a party, the court allowed Ralph Petty and John 
Caine to both continue to prosecute this action on behalf of all 
three parties, and file documents in defense of defendant's 
various motions. In addition, it was error to substitute Nupetco 
without also allowing the defendant to join or substitute the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership so that all unresolved issues 
between the parties could be resolved in a judicially economical 
fashion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS1 WERE NOT 
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. AS A RESULT, 
DEFENDANT MARTINEAU WAS DENIED THE ABILITY TO 
DETERMINE PROPER DEFENSES, COUNTERCLAIMS AND 
WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO MAKE AN 
INFORMED DECISION AS TO THE STIPULATION WHICH 
LED TO THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF OCTOBER 11, 
1985. 
The complaint was filed by Mike Strand and MLK Investments, 
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a related entity, on July 29, 1983, seeking judgment against 
defendants for monies allegedly loaned them in the amount of 
$427,989,25. (R. 2) Defendant Magic Valley Properties was a 
partnership formed to purchase and hold real property on which a 
car dealership was to be operated by Magic Valley Motors, an 
Idaho corporation. It was Strand's position that the entire 
amount had been loaned by him as an independent third party to 
the partnership. Defendant Martineau was the only defendant 
served, and he disputed that the entire amount was a loan, 
claiming instead that Strand was a partner also and had invested 
monies into the partnership. Martineau also counterclaimed for 
amounts due him from Strand and MLK for accounting services 
rendered these plaintiffs, their related entities, and Magic 
Valley Properties. (R. 5) At the time he answered and 
counterclaimed, the defendant had no idea that the mortgage upon 
which plaintiffs relied had been previously assigned to a third 
party, Nupetco Associates. (R. 271) Therefore, the defenses and 
claims he asserted were only those available against the named 
plaintiffs. 
It was also without knowledge of the assignment that 
defendant entered into the stipulation agreeing to the amount of 
the debt which was secured by the mortgage submitted by 
plaintiffs. (R. 165 - 169) This stipulation led to the Order 
and Judgment dated October 11, 1985. (R. 50) 
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Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "The court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for • . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment." 
After learning of the assignment of the mortgage by 
plaintiffs to Nupetco prior to their bringing suit, Martineau 
brought a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7) because the 
plaintiffs were not the real party in interest under Rule 17(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that "Every 
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest," The policy behind this requirement was addressed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1980). In Shurtleff, the court stated: 
A defendant has the right to have a cause of 
action prosecuted by the real party in 
interest to avoid further action on the same 
demand by another and to permit the defendant 
to assert all defenses or counterclaims 
available against the real owner of the 
cause. 
Id. at 1172 (citing Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 
(1952)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also directly addressed the issue 
of whether an assignor, such as Strand and MLK herein, is a real 
party in interest. In Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 
P.2d 464 (1962) the court concluded that "The general rule is 
that an assignee is the real party in interest." Id. at 468. 
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Another factor to consider in determining whether a party to 
an action is the real party in interest and capable of bringing 
suit is whether that party owns the right to do so and has 
authority to discharge the liability. This test was outlined by 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in L, R. Property Management, 
Inc. v. Grebe, 96 N.M. 22, 627 P.2d 864 (1981). In this case, 
the New Mexico Court cited Rule 17(a) of the New Mexico Rules of 
Civil Procedure and stated that this rule: 
[R]equires every action to be prosecuted in 
the name of the real party in interest. A 
real party in interest is 'determined by 
whether one is the owner of the right being 
enforced and is in a position to discharge 
the defendant from liability being asserted 
in the suit.! 
Id. at 865 (Citing Jesko v. Stauffer Chemical Company, 89 N.M. 
786, 790, 558 P.2d 55, 59 (Ct. App. 1976) (Other citations 
omitted in original.)) 
These principals are directly applicable to the facts of 
this case on appeal, and they entitled Lee Martineau to relief 
from the Order and Judgment entered on October 11, 198 5. 
The original action was an action on an alleged debt, and 
the plaintiffs1 claims were based on an oral contract. There was 
no promissory note or other documentation evidencing the debt. 
The plaintiffs did produce a mortgage securing debt "in excess of 
$200,000.00." (R. 64) However, having assigned this mortgage, 
the plaintiffs were no longer the owner of the right being 
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enforced and could not have discharged the defendants from 
liability asserted under that document• In addition, although 
there was no dispute that defendant Martineau was a partner of 
Magic Valley Properties and signed for the partnership, there was 
a dispute over whether Strand was also a partner and whether the 
monies he claimed he had loaned to defendants were in fact 
investments made by him. Finally, Martineau asserted offsets and 
claims against Strand, both as an individual and as a partner of 
Magic Valley Properties. 
It was under this scenario and mind set that Martineau 
entered the stipulation allowing Strand and MLK to foreclose on 
the Idaho property. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the 
stipulation, if there was a deficiency, the parties would once 
again be before the court; and Martineau would still have his 
defenses and claims to offsets and amounts owing him from Strand. 
Instead, after Nupetco filed suit in Idaho to foreclose on the 
real property located there, Martineau learned that the mortgage 
had been assigned. 
Defendant Martineau was prejudiced by this assignment and 
the fact that he did not know about it, both in his decisions to 
defend the action and in his decision to enter the stipulation. 
To begin with, there was no promissory note evidencing the debt, 
and therefore, Martineau had an absolute defense as against a 
third-party assignee. In addition, Nupetco was not a party to 
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the alleged oral agreement for a loan upon which the entire 
complaint in this action was based. 
Because the assignment prevented Martineau from knowing and 
asserting defenses against the real party in interest, the trial 
court erred in denying plaintiffs1 motion for relief from the 
judgment. Instead, pursuant to Rule 17(a), the court should have 
vacated the order and allowed a reasonable time "for ratification 
or commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest." Therefore, the Order and Judgment 
of October 11, 1985 should be vacated and the matter remanded for 
trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING ITS ORDER 
OF OCTOBER 11, 1985, TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND THEIR ASSIGNEE TO PROCEED AGAINST THE 
PERSONAL ASSETS OF LELAND MARTINEAU. 
There is simply no basis in law or fact which would support 
the trial court's granting plaintiffs1 motion to amend the Order 
and Judgment of October 11, 1985, to enter a money judgment 
against Martineau and to allow plaintiffs to proceed against his 
personal assets. 
To begin with, the stipulation in court between the parties 
on September 3rd was merely to the effect that the mortgage 
secured a debt in the amount of $327,989.25 and that plaintiffs 
would foreclose on that mortgage prior to seeking a possible 
deficiency. (R. 165 - 169). There is no stipulation that the 
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debt is Lee Martineaufs debt and no stipulation that judgment 
could be entered against him in the above amount, (See R. 165; 
Order and Judgment, R. 50 - 51; Minute Entry, R. 41; and Joint 
Affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp and William W. Barrett R. 349). 
Although the record is contradictory as to the exact terms of the 
stipulation, even the language used in the order does not grant a 
money judgment. Under the order, the parties agreed: 1) that 
the named plaintiffs would proceed in Idaho to foreclose on the 
real property and each party reserved the issues of whether a 
deficiency judgment would enter and whether that would be against 
Lee Martineau; 2) whether Lee Martineau was entitled to offsets 
and judgment against the plaintiffs pursuant to the allegations 
in his answer and counterclaim; and 3) whether the remaining 
$100,000.00 claimed by the plaintiffs was a loan to the 
defendants or an investment in Magic Valley Properties. (R. 50) 
As a result, there is no factual basis and no evidence in 
the record supporting the court's decision to amend the judgment 
to allow plaintiff to proceed against the personal assets of 
defendant Lee Martineau to satisfy an amount which was never 
entered as a judgment against him. 
In addition, there is no legal basis for a personal judgment 
to have been entered. Plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment 
(R. 305) was brought on the basis that defendant Lee Martineau 
was in contempt of court for having breached his stipulation, and 
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therefore the plaintiffs alleged they should be entitled to 
proceed against him personally as a punishment therefor. 
However, the plaintiffs then turned around and also argued in 
support of the motion that the Utah courts did not have 
jurisdiction over the Idaho property, and therefore the part of 
the order requiring them to foreclose is not binding on the 
plaintiffs anyway—even though their failure to foreclose is also 
a breach of the stipulation and in contempt of the order of 
October 11, 1985. (R. 310) 
While plaintiffs cited authority in their supporting 
memorandum that a court can find a breaching party in contempt, 
the plaintiffs cited no authority that the remedy they sought was 
within the court's power to award for such contempt. First, the 
document at issue is a mortgage, and pursuant to both Idaho law 
embodied in Idaho Code § 6-101 and 6-108 and Utah law outlined in 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 and 2 (1987), a party must first 
exhaust its security before seeking a deficiency judgment against 
an individual. There is simply no law to support a contention 
that if the plaintiff has difficulty foreclosing, he is entitled 
to judgment for the entire amount without doing so. The law is 
well settled to the contrary. 
The one action rule quite simply prohibits a mortgagee from 
proceeding personally against a mortgagor until the mortgagee 
sells the property that is the subject of the mortgage and 
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applies the proceeds to the amount secured by the mortgage. This 
principal is well established and admits of no exception. One of 
the earliest cases interpreting Utah law was Hammond v. Wall, 171 
P. 148 (Utah 1917) wherein the Supreme Court of Utah cited 
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 16 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909) and stated: 
In that case . . . we, in effect, held that 
actions to foreclose mortgages under our 
statute are essentially actions in rem; that 
until the mortgaged property is sold and the 
proceeds of sale are applied in discharge of 
the mortgage, there is no personal liability 
on the part of the mortgagor, and 'that the 
personal liability of the mortgagor cannot, 
without his consent, be enforced until after 
the sale and for the deficiency only.f . . . 
In this jurisdiction, therefore, the courts, 
in mortgage foreclosure cases, can impose a 
personal liability on the mortgagor only 
after having ordered a sale of the mortgaged 
property and after the sale thereof has been 
had according to law, and then he may be held 
liable only in case there is a deficiency. 
Id. at 150 (emphasis added). 
The court went on to point out that the provisions of the 
one action rule are mandatory: 
[U]nder our statute in mortgage foreclosures, 
both the suit and the remedy do not and 
cannot operate upon the mortgagor personally, 
although he is a defendant in the action 
unless and until the remedy against the 
mortgaged property is exhausted. Nor can it 
be said that the remedy pointed out by our 
statute is cumulative merely, and that a 
court of equity may, nevertheless, grant any 
relief known to such courts. 
Id. at 151. 
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Several years later, in First National Bank of Coalville v. 
Boley, 61 P.2d 621 (Utah 1936), the Supreme Court of Utah 
summarized what had become a well established principal of law: 
We have held that under these sections there 
is no personal liability by the mortgagor 
until after a foreclosure sale of the 
security, and then only for the deficiency 
remaining unpaid, and that a mortgagee may 
not have a personal judgment against a 
mortgagor until the security has been first 
exhausted. 
Id. at 623 (citations omitted). 
As a result, not only was the relief requested by the 
plaintiff not supported by law, it is contrary to law. At no 
time did Lee Martineau agree that judgment be entered against him 
prior to foreclosure of the real property, and the court never 
received evidence to determine that the debt was owing to 
plaintiffs by defendant Martineau. Finally, the plaintiffs 
agreed to rely on a mortgage which later they simply did not 
foreclose. 
Plaintiff's second argument that the Utah courts had 
inpersonum jurisdiction over Lee Martineau but did not have in 
rem jurisdiction over the Idaho property was not a basis to grant 
the relief requested. The debt at issue was secured by a 
mortgage on real property located in Idaho which the parties 
agreed that plaintiffs would first foreclose. Therefore, the 
logical conclusion of plaintiffs1 arguments that the Utah court 
did not have jurisdiction, would be that the Utah court must 
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dismiss this entire action, and any personal judgment sought by 
plaintiff against Martineau could only be entered by the Idaho 
court. Therefore, not only does argument does not support 
plaintiffs1 position that they were entitled to personal judgment 
against Martineau based upon his alleged contempt, it would 
result in this entire case being dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
In addition, there existed factual issues on plaintiff's 
basic premise that Lee Martineau was even in contempt of the 
October 11, 1985, Order and Judgment. By the terms of the Order 
and Judgment, Martineau waived defenses as to the validity of the 
mortgage as against Mike Strand and MLK. Nupetco was not a party 
to this action, was not a party to the stipulation and was not a 
party to the Order and Judgment. Therefore, defendant Martineau 
did not waive his defenses as to Nupetco. He could not have done 
so because he had no knowledge of the assignment at the time he 
entered the stipulation. 
Therefore, the trial court's entry of personal judgment 
against Martineau is wholly without legal or factual support. 
Lee Martineau never stipulated to judgment against him, and the 
court never heard evidence to determine if a debt was owing by 
him. The Order and Judgment itself of October 11, 1985, does 
not, by its terms, grant judgment against him. There exist 
factual and legal issues as to whether defenses raised in the 
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Idaho foreclosure suit by Magic Valley Properties against Nupetco 
are a breach of the stipulation in this action with Michael 
Strand and MLK and whether any such breach subjected Lee 
Martineau to contempt charges. 
Even assuming contempt, there is no statutory or case law 
allowing a court to enter personal judgment as a remedy for 
contempt against a party to a mortgage for the entire amount of 
the debt prior to sale of the security. Having done so, serious 
questions arise as to whether the court has subjected Lee 
Martineau to double liability and whether plaintiffs can still 
foreclose on the Idaho property while at the same time execute on 
the personal assets of Lee Martineau. 
As a result, the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs1 
motion to amend the judgment to allow the plaintiffs to proceed 
against the personal assets of Lee Martineau prior to requiring 
the sale of the mortgaged property and a determination of a 
deficiency. That order should be vacated and the matter remanded 
for trial on the issues herein. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST LELAND MARTINEAU DISMISSING 
THIS ACTION AND THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM 
ASSERTING HIS OFFSETS AND COUNTERCLAIMS TO 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST HIM. 
Pursuant to order of the court outlined in the Minute Entry 
dated December 4, 1987, (R. 391) Martineau submitted his 
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affidavit of claimed offsets in support of his motion to stay 
execution of any judgment against him pending trial. (R. 420) 
These offsets included items of which the plaintiffs had notice 
since before the complaint was filed in 1983. These consisted of 
amounts due for accounting services rendered Strand and his 
related entities and amounts claimed for one-half of expenses 
paid and services rendered by Martineau on behalf of Magic Valley 
Properties based on Martineaufs claim that he and Strand were 
partners in Magic Valley Properties. The third category of 
claimed offsets was for the Hammons Judgment which was entered 
against Strand in the case of Strand v. Hammons, Civil No. 
82-8686. The judgment is held by the Hammons-Martineau 
Partnership of which Martineau is a general partner. 
All of these claims and offsets were assigned to the 
partnership during the course of this proceeding. On the morning 
of trial, Mr. Petty asserted that, due to this assignment, 
Martineau no longer had any right to assert the offsets because a 
partner cannot use partnership property for his personal benefit. 
Judge Moffat continued the trial, ordered the parties to brief 
the issue and ordered defendant not to make any transfers or 
disposition of the partnership interests and offsets pending 
resolution of the issue. Oral arguments were heard on April 22, 
1988, and Judge Daniels took the matter under advisement. (R. 
560) On August 23, 1988, the Judge granted plaintiffs1 motion in 
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a Minute Entry, stating "The law appears to be that one who 
assigns his offsets cannot assert them as a counter-claim. The 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted." (R. 561) 
This result is contrary to law and equity, and is 
inconsistent with previous rulings of the court. 
While it is generally true that a partner cannot personally 
control partnership assets, under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-22 
(1989), this general rule is made subject to partnership purposes 
and/or agreement between the parties. Section 48-1-22 provides 
as follows: 
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners 
of specific partnership property holding as a 
tenant in partnership. 
(2) The incidence of this tenancy are such 
that: 
(a) A partner, subject to the 
provisions of this Chapter and to any 
agreement between the partners, has an equal 
right with his partners to possess specific 
partnership property for partnership 
purposes; but he has no right to possess such 
property for any other purposes without the 
consent of his partners. 
(Emphasis added) . 
These provisions are directly applicable to this issue on 
appeal. The Hammons-Martineau Partnership was created for the 
purposes of, among other things, the operation of defendant Magic 
Valley Properties and the collection of Strandfs assets. Article 
I of the partnership agreement states as follows: 
NAME, PURPOSE AND DOMICILE. The name of the 
Partnership shall be the Hammons-Martineau 
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Partnership. The Partnership shall be 
conducted for the purposes of conducting 
various forms of business enterprises, 
including but not limited to the operation of 
Magic Valley Properties and the collection of 
any assets of Michael W. Strand or related 
entities. 
(R. 481) 
This language in the partnership agreement, as well as the 
partnership minutes, establish that at all times both partners to 
the Hammons-Martineau Partnership intended that Lee Martineau 
would personally claim the offsets at issue in this matter. 
Consistently with this authority to do so and pursuant to court 
order, (R. 620 - 621) Martineau has used the Hammons judgment as 
a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the judgment against him 
pending this appeal. 
At all times, Mr. Martineau represented to the court that, 
with leave of court to do so, he could obtain written 
ratification of his personal use of these offsets, assignment of 
them back to him in his individual capacity or the joinder or 
substitution of the partnership as a defendant. Instead, the 
court dismissed his claims in a brief minute entry to the effect 
that "The law appears to be that one who assigns his offsets 
cannot assert them as a counterclaim." Such a conclusion is 
contrary to law, and summary judgment against Martineau 
dismissing his counterclaims should be vacated and the matter 
remanded for trial. 
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The decision of the trial court is also wholly inequitable 
and improper in light of the history of this case. Plaintiff's 
argument is, in essence, that Martineau was no longer the real 
party in interest because of his assignment to an entity. To 
begin with, under Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, an objection that Lee Martineau is no longer the real 
party in interest is expressly not grounds for dismissal of his 
counterclaims. Rule 17(a) states, in part that: 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground 
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable 
time has been allowed after objection for 
ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of the real 
party in interest. 
This requirement that a party be allowed a reasonable time 
to obtain authority to assert claims or join the proper parties 
to an action is further supported by the requirements outlined in 
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 25(c) 
states as follows: 
(c) Transfer of Interest. In the case of 
any transfer of interest, the action may be 
continued by or against the original party, 
unless the court upon motion directs the 
person to whom the interest is transferred to 
be substituted in the action or joined with 
the original party. Service of the motion 
shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a) 
of this Rule. 
Therefore, even assuming that Martineau did not have formal 
authority to assert the assigned offsets and claims at the time 
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of trial, the dismissal of the counterclaims is contrary to the 
express provisions of Rule 17(a) and Rule 25(c). At the very 
least, the court is required to allow a period of time for 
joinder or substitution of the proper parties. As represented to 
the court, the partnership was at all times willing to become a 
party to the suit or execute the documentation necessary to 
ratify Martineau's assertion of the offsets and allow the case to 
continue. 
The public policy behind these provisions is sound, and it 
prevents extended and increased litigation in court case loads as 
well as stalemates in pending litigation. This policy was 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 
559, 252 P.2d 538 (1953) wherein the plaintiff was the assignee 
of property from the defendant during a quiet title action 
pending between the defendant and a third party. Mr. Briggs had 
paid that third party to settle the suit with Hess and then sued 
Hess himself. The Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
The answer to any contention that the court 
lost jurisdiction in this suit between Tree 
and Hess when the latter conveyed during the 
pendency of the action, might well be found 
in Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
designed to continue the litigation with the 
same litigants to a determinative conclusion. 
Were it otherwise, litigation might arrive at 
stalemate by the simple device of a 
conveyance pendente lite, resulting in a 
series of endless suits. 
Id. at 539. 
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In this case, the court's decision has rendered Martineau*s 
offsets meaningless by its decision, and the effect of that is to 
force an independent suit by the Hammons-Martineau Partnership. 
Therefore, not only is the decision contrary to the express 
provisions of Rules 17 and 25, but it is also unsound from a 
policy standpoint. 
Further, given that the court allowed the named plaintiffs 
Strand and MLK to continue prosecuting this action even though 
the mortgage had been assigned to Nupetco, it is wholly 
inconsistent and inequitable for the court to dismiss Martineaufs 
claims on the identical basis. The Minute Entry statement that: 
"The law appears to be that one who assigns his offsets cannot 
assert them as a counterclaim" is completely contrary to the 
court's previously having allowed Strand and MLK to assert claims 
pursuant to a mortgage assigned to Nupetco prior to commencement 
of this suit. 
It is also contrary to the court's allowing both John Caine, 
on behalf of the plaintiffs Strand and MLK, and Ralph Petty on 
behalf of Nupetco, to submit motions, memorandums and other 
documents throughout the course of these proceedings. Mr. Petty 
represented an assignee who was not made a party to this suit 
until April 26, 1989; (R. 663) and if, as Judge Daniels stated, 
everyone knew all along that Nupetco was the plaintiff, (See Pg. 
9 of Transcript beginning at R. 696) then it was improper to 
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allow the named plaintiffs Strand and MLK to also continue to 
assert rights, file motions and respond to defendants motions. 
Finally, the decision in August of 1988 to grant the summary 
judgment and dismiss the action on the basis that the claims were 
partnership property is wholly inconsistent with the court's 
granting defendant's motion to stay execution pending trial in 
December of 1987. (R. 444) At that time Mr. Petty also argued 
that Martineau could not use the judgment against Strand as an 
offset because it was a partnership asset. (R. 435) The court 
continues to allow Martineau to use the Hammons Judgment as a 
supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal. 
The dismissal of Martineaufs claims are therefore, contrary 
to law and wholly inequitable and improper under the totality of 
circumstances in this case. By granting summary judgment, the 
court has denied Martineau his effective defenses to the original 
suit and the judgment entered against him, and it has denied him 
the right to assert his claims against all the plaintiffs. 
Summary judgment dismissing his claim should be reversed and the 
issues remanded for trial. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN JOINING NUPETCO AS A PARTY 
IN 
AS 
APRIL 
A 
OF 
PARTY 
1989 
TO 
AND ALLOWING 
THIS PROCEEDING 
NUPETCO 
PRIOR 
TO 
TO 
ACT 
THAT 
JOINDER. 
Although Nupetco was the holder of the mortgage at issue, 
this suit was instigated by the assignors, Michael Strand and 
MLK. Nupetco was not made a party until order of the court dated 
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April 26, 1989 (R. 663 - 664) , and in fact prior to that time 
Nupetco had affirmatively resisted becoming a party. 
The April 26th order arose out of a hearing in October of 
1988 on unrelated and miscellaneous motions and objections. 
During that hearing, the court pointed out to John Caine, 
attorney for Strand and MLK, when he represented to the court 
that judgment had been granted Nupetco, "The pleadings have never 
really been amended." (See pg. 5 of transcript beginning at R. 
696) 
In his responsive argument, Mr. Green objected to a 
substitution of parties on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances; and the fact that defendant had, over the course 
of this proceeding, requested the court and the plaintiffs to 
join Nupetco as a party, but Nupetco had always resisted and 
refused. The defendant also objected based upon the inequity of 
the court's refusal to allow Martineau to join the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership to this suit and thus preserve his 
offsets and claims. (See Pg. 8 - 10 of the transcript) 
Nupetco was not a party either when the summary judgment was 
amended to allow plaintiff to proceed against the personal assets 
of Martineau; when the parties went to trial on the issues of 
offsets; or when judgment was entered dismissing defendant's 
counterclaims. Therefore, it was inequitable and prejudicial 
error to join them in April of 1989. Although the court states 
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that it was Mr. Caine's motion to do so, the transcript beginning 
at Page 696 of the Record shows that in fact the motion was that 
of the court. 
Prior to the order substituting parties in April of 1989, it 
was also error to allow both John Caine on behalf of Mike Strand 
and MLK and Ralph Petty on behalf of Nupetco to prosecute this 
action. Strand and MLK claim now not to have been the real 
parties in interest, and Nupetco was not legally a party until 
long after the substantive orders had been entered. 
Such confusion has prejudiced defendant Martineau, and the 
order substituting parties should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
This action began as an action on an oral contract with the 
defendant counterclaiming for amounts due him from plaintiffs. 
It has ended in the trial court with a personal judgment against 
Leland Martineau for a debt secured by real property which has 
not been foreclosed, and a dismissal of all Leland Martineau's 
offsets to and counterclaims against that judgment. 
First, Mr. Martineau entered a stipulation with Strand and 
MLK not knowing they had previously assigned the mortgage at 
issue to a third party. The terms of the stipulation set a sum 
certain for the debt and required plaintiffs to foreclose the 
property located in Idaho. When he learned that the mortgage had 
been assigned, Mr. Martineau brought a motion for relief from 
40 
judgment. It was error for the court to have denied the motion 
because Leland Martineau has been precluded from effectively 
defending this action as a result of the assignment and his not 
knowing about it. He is prejudiced because he simply would not 
have defended the action and entered the stipulation had he known 
of the assignment. 
The plaintiffs then returned to court to seek to be allowed 
to proceed against Leland Martineau personally for the secured 
debt. The plaintiffs claimed he was in contempt of the 
stipulation because Magic Valley Properties had raised defenses 
against Nupetco's attempts to foreclose the property. The court 
granted plaintiffs1 motion; and although there has never been a 
personal judgment entered against Leland Martineau, plaintiffs1 
assignee can now proceed to satisfy the debt of $327,989.25 from 
the personal assets of Leland Martineau. Such a result is wholly 
contrary to law, fact and equity. 
Finally, the court dismissed all of Leland Martineau's 
claims against the plaintiffs and his offsets to the judgment 
because prior to trial, Leland Martineau had assigned them to a 
partnership of which he was a general partner. This result flies 
in the face of the court's previously allowing Strand and MLK to 
continue prosecuting the action despite their assignment of the 
mortgage to Nupetco and totally inconsistent with the court's 
allowing defendant Leland Martineau to use a judgment also owned 
by the partnership as a basis to stay execution pending trial and 
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now pending appeal. Finally, the fact that the court did not 
allow Leland Martineau time to ratify his use of the claims or 
join or substitute the partnership prior to such dismissal 
expressly violates Rules 17 and 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to set aside the 
Order and Judgment of October 11, 1985, in entering personal 
judgment against Leland Martineau and in dismissing his 
counterclaims and offsets. All three orders should be vacated 
and all issues remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of December, 1989. 
N (USB #1242) 
KIM M. ttJHN (USB #5105) 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of December, 1989, I 
caused to be hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant Leland Martineau to: 
Ralph C. Petty 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Leland 
42 
Martineau to: 
John T. Caine 
Richards, Caine & Richards 
2568 South Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 S. Washington. Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 801 399-4191 
•a F-
IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK INVESTMENTS, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES WATERS, 
MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS, INC., and MAGIC 
VALLEY PROPERTIES, a partnership, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGEMENT 
3 4.A#/ /rp , &7si-
Civil No. C-83-5680 
This matter having come on for trial on September 3, 1985 before 
the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge of the above entitled Court, plaintiffs 
being personally present and represented by their attorney John T. Caine and 
the defendant Martineau being personally present and represented by his attorney 
Carman Kipp. The trial having commenced and a motion having been made by the 
defendant and the parties having stipulated to certain facts, and the Court being 
fully advised in the premise now makes the following order and judgement: 
1. The mortgage attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a valid 
mortgage given to the plaintiff, Michael Strand by 
Leland Martineau and Charles Waters to secure an obligation 
of $327,989.25 which obligation was incurred on or about May 24, 
1979 and which obligation bears interest at the rate of 8% 
from July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981 and 12% per annum thereafter 
until paid in full, with an unpaid balance of principle and 
interest as of October 11, 1985 of $522, 769.72. 
2. That any defenses which defendants may have against the validity 
of said mortgage under either Utah or Idaho law are hereby 
waived. 
.Afiibi r—4. r/>fLQ ; U Sjv.,' 
3. That pursuant to Section 18-31-1 UCA (as amended 1953), 
that plaintiffs are required to foreclose said mortgage 
against the property which is located in Cassia County, 
State of Idaho before proceeding against the personal 
assets of the defendant Martineau. 
4. That all other claims which either party to this action 
may have against the other, with the exception of those 
defenses specifically waived in paragraph 2 are hereby 
reserved and remain pending in this Court. 
DATED this 11th day of October, 1985. 
°^^¥A £
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
,^&i^:rr:~--
I FILMED 
JOHN T . CMNI7, of 
RIQ' tARDS, O M N E ft ALLEN 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
2f)6o W a s h i n g t o n B o u l e v a r d 
O g U e n , U t a h G4401 
T e l e p h o n e : 3 9 9 - 4 1 9 ! 
FiLEO \H CLERK'S OPrlCE 
SaU Lake Ccuruy U'ah 
NOV 10 1936 
H. DIKQ/I-l-.nc.liV/. CpM '>.:! Di/fl. Court 
By dii^JUia^McJ: 
Deputy Clerk 
IN 71 IF. D I S T R I C T OCTIRT 
JNTY OF SALT LAICF, 3TATF OF UTAH 
MIG-IAFL W. STRANT) *»KI 
WI..IC INVFSU4FNTS, a P a r h . ^ r s i i i n , 
P l a i n t / f f s , 
vs.* 
LFLAND A. MARTINIVvlF ^ c . . , [ . , 
Fe f enda.« i; s , 
Til i .y «'if.« t t e.r o a m e o u f n r h e a r i a g on De f e n da u t , L e i a n d 
FV\r »; i n e a u ' js, m o t i o n Fni F e l i i - f f rom j u d g m e n t on [hi-: 2u[U d ay of 
S e p l o»')'n'. r ; J ;*» oG , of. f <.. j* <-: \ I) e I In JIO r a h I «-• S o n i i »r);n» i «:! I s , D i s t r i c t 
j 11 (1 g e ; i) e r s o u a 1 I y a < •>»e a r »•*. d t» i e rj j a i ; i t i f f s a n d t!« o i r a t* l o r n e y , 
j o h; i T . C a i u < ••; t:! • a L N u • > e t o o A s s <_> c i a i: e s , MM i 11 \ »-• r o s t e d o a r t y wa s 
i)i*r s o n a i 1 y o r o s <-; n i; n n d r e p r e s e n t e d l.iy thi«. i r a t t o r n e y , D a n i e l 
J a o k s o n ; a n d >: h o. r*e f«* 11 d n n t , L e i an«1 k-.l>i v I in e a u , --/a s a o t p r e s en t , 
b u t V/H$ r^ijre.{?ei)tt j.»l by h i s a t t o r n e y , CarniOH F , Kim. ) , ; 
T h e C»»11 r I > • a v i n g r e c e i v e d w r i t t e n Mem o r a u d a f r oin t li e 
p a r t i e s , h a v i n g h e a r d o r a l a r g u m e n t a n d h a v i n g t a k e n t h e m a t t e r 
u n d e r a di v i s<-i u-n t ;oid b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d in t h e p r e m i s e s , NOW, 
I • / U A A /» . . 
t£XHIBlT. 
1. That Defendant's Motion, pursuant lo Kul.» 00 (h) of I. ho 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside judgment is denied. 
The. Court having determined that He f ^ ndan t ' s reliance on Rule 
17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-, is unfounded and has 
not precluded him from asserting defenses, counterclaims or 
r (-'.mod' i e s . S & i d d e f e u s e s h a v i n g b e e n w a i v e d p u r s u ant to t h e 
parties Stipulation in open Court during the trial o\ this case 
<-. * i - .« ° l o o p 
on Sep te inu^ i •> > 1 ;M> J . 
2 . T h a t t h e O r d e r a n d J u d g m e n t e n t e r e d by t h i s C o u r t 
p u r s u a n t t o t h e a b o v e r e f e r e n c e d S t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s on 
O c l o,b e r 1 1 ; 1 fi 8 5 i s i n f u l l f o r c e a n d e f f e c t , w i t h o u t 
mod i f i en i: i on , 
3. f,aeh p a r l y w i l l bear t h e i r ovva a t t o r n e y ' s f ees and c o s t s 
o f Co n r t f o r t li i s »i <-• a r i n g . 
rVvTF.I; t h i s ( 0 (lay of N o v e m b e r , <!Vo(h 
r - \ / T"t tT7 C ' V \ T r» \<-r* . 
ATTEST S C^f^rJA^ 
H. DIXON MiNOLfiY SCOTT DAN I El ,S 
/ Or*t\ [) i s t r i c c Co»i r t j " < > g e 
V l /"V~P T <^~*«T T V S /""•*/"•»? Tt» T,~t T ^  T 
1 «V / t 1 V . . i . . 1 V J V A /t.,J| MQ I ' . 
TO: C/v'-i;viliN P . K I V-P . A l t o r 11ey f o r D« • f e 11 d a n t s : 
You will please take notice that the undersignod Attorney 
for Plaintiffs will submit the above and foregoing Order to the 
Honorable Scott Daniels for his signature ii"on the expiration of' 
five (!)) days from the date this notice is mailed to you unless! 
written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 
RICHARDS, CAINE AND ALLEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
LEGAL ARTS BUILDING SUITE 200 
2568 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN. UTAH 84401 
(801) 399-4191 
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John T. Caine #0536 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
2568 S, Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 399-4191 
and 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
32 Exchange Place Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK 
INVESTMENTS, a partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES 
WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS, 
I N C . , and MAGIC VALLEY 
PROPERTIES, a p a r t n e r s h i p . 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
P l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n t o Amend t h e O r d e r a n d J u d g m e n t , 
d a t e d O c t o b e r 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , t o r e m o v e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f f o r e c l o s e on t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y i n I d a h o b e f o r e 
p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t t h e p e r s o n a l a s s e t s of t h e D e f e n d a n t 
M a r t i n e a u , c a m e on r e g u l a r l y b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e J u d g e 
S c o t t D a n i e l s on N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 8 7 , P l a i n t i f f ' s A s s i g n e e 
N u p e t c o A s s o c i a t e s was p r e s e n t a n d r e p r e s e n t e d by J o h n T . 
C a i n e a n d R a l p h C. P e t t y , D e f e n d a n t M a r t i n e a u a p p e a r e d i n 
>ILED IW CLERIVS OFFICE 
Salt Uko County Utah 
PLC i 1987 
:\'Ajl 3rd Di3t. Court 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER 
Civil No. C83-5680 
Judge Scott Daniels 
L~Axif&t r c 
p e r s o n a n d was r e p r e s e n t e d by C o u n s e l J o h n C . G r e e n , t h e 
C o u r t h a v i n g r e v i e w e d t h e f i l e s a n d r e c o r d s h e r e i n , h a v i n g 
r e v i e w e d t h e m e m o r a n d a of t h e p a r t i e s , a n d r e c e i v e d t h e 
a r g u m e n t s o f c o u n s e l , a n d f o r g o o d c a u s e a p p e a r i n g , 
t h e r e f o r e : 
IT I S HEREBY ORDERED t h a t P l a i n t i f f s 1 M o t i o n be and t h e 
same i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d . jT\~> 
DATED t h i s _ J d^y of Npv€mber , 1 9 8 7 . 
By t h e C o u r t : 
ScOtTt n a T i i e l s , J u d g e 
ATTEST 
H. EXXON WtSDLEY 
A p p r o v e d a s t o Form: ^ L^/fy^^X^-
J o h n C. G r e e n 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to John C. Green at 48 Post Office Place, 
#300, Salt Lake City, Utah, this j^^l/C^ day of November, 
19 87. /J:&/?«* 
/ 
John T. Caine #0536 
Richards, Caine & Richards 
2568 S. Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Phone (801) 399-4191 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, a Utah : 
Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS, 
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY 
PROPERTIES, a partnership. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST LELAND A. MARTINEAU 
: Civil No. C83-5680 
: Judge Scott Daniels 
Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
before the Honorable Judge Scott Daniels on April 22, 1988 at the 
hour of 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff having been represented by John T. 
Caine and Ralph C. Petty, Defendant Leland A. Martineau having 
been represented by John C. Green, the Court having reviewed the 
memoranda and affidavits submitted by the parties, having 
reviewed the files and records herein, having received the oral 
arguments of Counsel, having found that there are no material 
issues of fact, that Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his 
1 !..<{< Judicial District 
APR 2 6 1989 
/ ' S/.LVlAiS£COUN/Y 
°
y
- ' ' • * " - * — ' o*poiy Clef. 
alleged interest in the claims and offsets asserted herein to 
another entity, and for good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that because 
Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his interest in the 
alleged claims and offsets asserted in this action to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is unable to assert said claims 
and offsets against the personal judgment entered against him, 
and the Court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff Nupetco Associates. All other claims Plaintiff Nupetco 
Associates may have against the Defendant Leland A. Martineau and 
Defendant Leland A. Martineau may have against Plaintiff Nupetco 
Associates or its assignor, Michael Strand, are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order constitutes a final 
order from which appeal may be taken. 
DATED this C 2 ^ day of April, 1989. 
By the Court: 
Ap]5ro\Xed as t o Form: 
/John C. Green 
S c o t t D a n i e l s , Judge 
< -C^x. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green,, 
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this IV day of April, 19 89.* ,. 
'/ ' 7 
John T. Caine #0536 
Richards, Caine & Richards 
2568 S. Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Phone (801) 399-4191 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK : 
INVESTMENTS, a partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v • 
LELAND A, MARTINEAU, CHARLES WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS, 
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY 
PROPERTIES, a partnership. 
Defendants. 
ORDER SUBSTITUTING 
: PARTIES 
Civil No. C83-5680 
: Judge Scott Daniels 
The above-entitled Court, having reviewed the files and 
records herein, having reviewed the Assignment of Plaintiff's 
interest in the above-entitled matter to Nupetco Associates, 
having reviewed the Stipulation of the parties before Judge 
Moffat at the previously scheduled trial date, having received 
the oral representations of the parties at the October 21 hearing 
and of its own motion, and for good cause appearing, therefore: 
TI..JC Judicial District 
APR 2 6 1989 
wATllttff tZ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJDUGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff 
Michael Strand and MLK Investments be substituted by Nupetco 
Associates, a Utah limited partnership, as Plaintiff. 
DATED this OA? day of April, 1989. 
By the Court: 
Scott Daniels, Judge 
Apgrov^d as to Form: 
J^hi/C. Green 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and 
correct .copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green, 
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this /( ' day of April, 1989. 
/ 1 "] 
